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REVIEWS
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
By Ralph Nader, Mark Green and Joel Seligman
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1976. Pp. 312. $10.50.
Reviewed by Larry D. Soderquist*
In this slightly changed version of a book published privately a year ago,
1
Nader, Green and Seligman take on the big corporation. They first briefly cata-
logue some perceived corporate evils - industrial pollution, discrimination, undue
political power, poor product safety and so on. Then, after describing what they
call the "collapse of state corporation law, " the authors launch into a series of
reform proposals built around the federal chartering of large corporations. It
would actually be more accurate to say they cast their proposals amid two hun-
dred pages of polemics on what is wrong in corporate America. Because of the
book's organization, it takes a good bit of effort just to ferret out what the
authors want.
What they propose is the federal incorporation of all industrial, retail and
transportation corporations transacting more than $250,000,000 of business an-
nually or engaging more than 10,000 United States employees (p. 240). Under
these criteria, about 700 corporations would be covered. The authors would re-
quire various changes in internal corporate management for federally-chartered
corporations, most dedicated to increasing shareholders' power and changing the
composition of boards of directors. Corporations having a federal charter would
also be subjected to increased regulation with respect to the environment, labor
relations, antitrust policing and other current social concerns.
The idea of using the federal chartering of corporations as a reform meas-
ure is a century-old idea that has come in and gone out of fashion several
times. It has received a fair amount of scholarly comment in the last few years,
2
and deserves careful consideration. Its time may have come. Clearly, Delaware has
led what Professor Cary has called the "race for the bottom ' in making its
corporation law as restriction-free as possible, and other states have followed the
Delaware example in an effort to grab a share of the fees and taxes generated by
incorporations. And there is little dispute that if one finds current state statues
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. B. S., Eastern Michigan University, 1966; J. D.,
Harvard University, 1969.
1. R. Nader, M. Green and J. Seligman, Constltutionalizing the Corporation: The Case for the
Federal Chartering of Giant Corporations (1976). This version was published by a Nader organization, The
Corporate Accountability Research Group, and was not widely distributed. The major difference between the
versions, other than the fact that the early version was not set in type and cost $25, is that the original was
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Taming the Giant Corporation
objectionable, some federal remedy is necessary. Regrettably, though, this book
does not advance the cause.
Although the book seems fairly well researched and is generally lucidly
written, it lacks an acceptable measure of balance or fairness, even when view-
ed as a piece of advocacy. One of the corporate shortcomings the authors decry
is the use of deceptive information (pp. 24-25), yet a certain looseness with the
facts in the cause of corporation taming does not seem to bother them.
A random example: The authors conclude a discussion of the Dartmouth
College case,4 contained in a chapter entitled "The Collapse of State Corporation
Law," by saying: "Under that ruling, after granting a corporate chapter, a legisla-
ture could no longer repeal or revise it" (p.35). That is a correct, though over-
simplified, statement about the holding in the case. But to fail also to mention
that the states got around the problem a century and a half ago, and in fact can
modify or repeal charters, changes the plain facts of history as surely as if the
authors had lied outright.
Another example, one revealing the authors' essential bias: In a section
discussing corporate invasions of the Constitutional right to privacy,' they discuss
industrial espionage:
For $15,000, Dr. Robert S. Aries offers to sell to the "managements of the
world's largest corporations" an Industrial Espionage Encyclopedia treat-
ing such topics as "How to fabricate fake memos for competitors' con-
sumption" and "How to make your competitor's R&D [that is, Research
and Development] work in the wrong direction."
Aries knows a market when he sees one. A survey in the November-
December 1974 issue of the Harvard Business Review reported that 72
percent of the respondents felt their "company should have a more syste-
mitic method of gathering, processing, analyzing, and reporting informa-
tion about competitors" (pp. 190-191).
The only surprising thing about the Harvard Business Review survey is
that 28 percent of those responding evidently thought they knew enough about
their competition. It hardly washes to imply that the survey respondents had
espionage in mind - or even that they would be interested in it. Not is it con-
sistent with the authors' views to imply that wanting more information is impro-
per. In fact, one of their major points is that corporations should make more infor-
mation available to competitors and others. Fifty pages before the espionage dis-
cussion, after making suggestions for greater disclosure, they say: "This [suggest-
ed] dissemination process will ensure that . . . competitors... will have access to
the kind of data they need to make intelligent ... economic decisions" (pp. 139-
140).
A number of the authors' proposals involve giving shareholders more pow-
er. One, for example, would allow any shareholder or shareholder group owning
one one-thousandth of the common stock of a corporation, or any group of at
4. Trustees of DartmouthCollege v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).
5. The authors seem to find that corporations are subject to certain Constitutional mandates re-
lating to governmental action, such as that they shall not infringe an employee's right to privacy, on the
ground that "like the state and municipal governments it overshadows, the giant business corporation is a
government" (p. 181). They offer little explanation of that rather curious idea.
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least 100 public shareholders, to nominate up to three directors. The corporation
would be required to submit these nominations, along with personal statements
by the nominees, to all of its shareholders. All financial institutions and other
"intermediaries" would be required to "pass through" to their beneficiaries the
right to vote stock held by them. Cumulative voting would be required. (pp. 127-
128.)
Another proposal would require a shareholder vote on a wide range of
corporate transactions, including "all business decisions above a certain mini-
mum size" (p.130). Six weeks notice would be necessary before the shareholder
vote, and the board would be required to explain why it favors the transaction
and why any board members voted against it. Any shareholder or group of share-
holders holding one percent of a corporation's outstanding stock would be allowed,
simultaneously with the board's notice of its proposal, to publish a dissenting
view, presumably at corporate expense. (pp. 129-130.)
Some of these ideas are unworkable. How, for example, could a sharehold-
er group publish, simultaneously with the board's notice of a proposal, a dissent-
ing view with respect to that proposal? Presumably, shareholders would not hear
about a proposal until the board gave notice. But the problem with the authors'
approach is even more fundamental. If shareholders were given more power and
a representative number of them were to exercise it, undoubtedly they would try
to make profit-maximizing decisions - not decisions in favor of the environment,
persons in the community or product quality and safety.6 In other words, it is al-
most certain they would wish to vote in opposition to the authors' desires.
Is there any way to account for this apparent oversight? The authors must
have considered the ease with which anyone could, with one call to a broker and
enough money to buy one share for each person in a group, form a group of 100
shareholders for the purpose of nominating directors. Do they hope that reform-
ers would form such groups, nominate directors and then slip their nominees by
the shareholders? In any case, these shareholder-power proposals are ill-conceived.
Turning over corporate power either to profit-hungry shareholders or to self-
appointed reformers, each of whom could be expected to have the interests of
some special group in mind, would be equally inadvisable.
There are, to be sure, major problems with corporate power in America.
But, contrary to what the authors think, giant corporations need redirection more
than taming. Corporations are quite efficient at what they do now - basically
making as much money as they can. What we need to do is keep that efficiency
while changing the corporate job description to include, along with profit making,
a concern for the interests of such groups as consumers, suppliers, employees,
persons in the communities in which corporations operate and the public generally.
Even if corporations were operated for the right ends, too much corporate
power, and too much concentration of that power, would continue to be un-
acceptable. We would still need restraints. It is regrettable that this book, which
will have a wider distribution than most in the field and which could have helped
precipitate needed reforms, is likely to be nearly useless for effecting either a
change in corporate purposes or restraints on corporate power.
6. See, e.g., M. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis, at 19 (1976).
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The Monthly Analysis of State Government and Politics
Thomas R. Hoeber, President and Publisher; Ed Salzman, Editor
Published by the California Center for Research and Education in Government,
1617 1 Oth Street, Sacrament6, California 95814
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After the 1974 California Democratic gubernatorial primary, Bob Moretti,
who had been one of the mainline candidates, complained that, during the cam-
paign, one television station ran one minute of an interview with him, and four
minutes during the same newscast about "togs for dogs." On another occasion, he
reported that a different station ran six minutes about a frog-jumping contest and
only a few seconds on his campaign remarks.
In a June, 1976, California Journal article excerpted from her book, "The
Hidden Campaign," Mary Ellen Leary documented how the broadcast media
actually creates news by the questionable goal of profit by titillation. "Happy
Talk" and "Action News" spew forth only the superficial, sacrificing explanation
for the summary comment - so much luck to one in search of keenness. Accord-
ing to Leary, this kind of exposure erodes the democratic process, deflecting the
campaign away from more intelligent voter participation. To salt the wounds of
those who are supposed to keep us informed, Leary argued that newspaper politi-
cal reporting was heavily influenced by television.
Whether or not Leary's contention is true across the board, the facts re-
main that national magazines cannot be expected to delve regularly into the inti-
macies of state governments, and local newspapers cannot support a staff of people
who think and write with clarity and depth on that same subject. The result, until
a few years ago, was that state politics simply did not come under very close
scrutiny by the press.
California Journal has become a refreshing exception to this sorry state of
affairs. Billing itself as presenting a "non-ideological analysis of California govern-
ment and politics," the Journal achieves this end by examining legislative trends,
personalities within the legislative process, and crucial information that affects
government as a whole. It has done this since 1970 in a style that is comprehen-
sive and polished.
Leary's article was just a sample of the way the Journal investigates and
explores movements within state government. More often than not, these analy-
ses have not met the public's eye before appearing on CJ's pages. The March,
1976 feature on the "Deceptive Image of the State Legislature" reviewed how
that body had changed in recent years from a down home collection of the "good
ol' boys" to the present era where individual legislators command close to $50,000
per year. In the face of an impression often put forth in press and broadcast
media depicting California's legislators 'as drunkards "diddling instead of deliber-
ating," this Journal investigation managed to convey a rather convincing argu-
ment that the present crop of legislators is well-qualified and hardworking.
Not always is the California Journal so generous. When the situation calls
for it, the Journal holds few bars. A January, 1976 cover story, "Controller Cory
and the Tangled Web," pulled together a vast and shady network of commercial
and political interests and was nothing short of a major expose which should
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leave those with similiar interests somewhat cautious in their dealings.
CJ's analysis of important legislative trends does not overlook the citi-
zens groups, whose public interest work has emerged as one of the most potent
of forces in the democratic process. In November, 1976, an article detailed how
these groups have devised canvassing operations that in one instance netted a
group $300,000 in a single year, no small feat for those perennially short of cash.
The issues regularly carry pieces on some of the more visible personalities
in state government, which unfortunately tend toward the chatty if not the sub-
missive. They do, however, make for some interesting yet light reading, and on
occasion are peppered with blood-boiling political realism. An example of the
latter is a sketch of State Senator Leo McCarthy's visit with Congressman Wilbur
Mills, who was then chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee. In
the early 70's, McCarthy journeyed to Washington with a group of California
politicians to discuss a family assistance bill. They were introduced to Mills by
Rep. Philip Burton (D., Calif.) who described them as being "all right" and de-
serving an open ear. Not unusually, McCarthy had done his homework and was
genuinely well-prepared, but in his gentlemanly manner was reluctant to engage
in Mills' country boy chatter. "After twenty minutes of farm talk," wrote the
author, "Mills said to leave the paper that had what they wanted and he would
take care of it."
The personality features tend to be at their best when placed within a
context of issue-oriented topics. For instance, Otto Bos of the San Diego Union
wrote an article concerning the wild dream of Mayor Pete Wilson to defeat Gov-
ernor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. in 1978 which touched off a number of similiar dis-
cussions elsewhere. This is typical of the Journal's insight; it possesses an enviable
knack of uncovering the seeds of developments long before other publications
become conscious of them. Way back in February of 1976, Leo Rennert, who
covers Washington for the Sacramento, Fresno, and Modesto Bees, reported
about the shaky position of then-Senator John Tunney; this was long before
other publications seriously brought up the probability of his defeat. Ed Salz-
man's article about Ronald Reagan pinpointed qualities that would lead to the
foreign policy gaffs that crippled the ex-governor's chances of defeating Gerald
Ford.
While the Journal's treatment of Jerry Brown has been thorough in its
reporting of regular governmental activities, it did not, during 1976, enter into
any serious discussion of the ramifications of Jerry Brown's ideas about politics
and cultural values. The pieces about Brown's record stress a review of his factual
performance, but treat his philosophical politics with a light touch. One need
hardly command a knowledge of 20th century politics to understand that Brown
may offer the first major break with New Deal liberalism yet felt by the Demo-
cratic Party. Gone is the illusion that cultural woes can be swooped away by an
act of agency creation. Gone too are the notions that continuous growth, bigness
and profit maximization are the only courses for the ship of state. Brown has
seriously called into question a gluttenous materialism and the vapid sense of
values this has spawned. In so doing, he has rejected the traditional American
direction expressed so well by Emerson, that "things are in the saddle and ride
mankind." Since these ideas border on the immoderate if not the radical, one
senses that Brown is not using them solely as attractive symbols, but rather that
they are part of a plan to elevate politics as an activity which addresses the very
terms upon which we live our lives.
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It is disappointing that the California Journal confines its coverage of
Jerry Brown to the mundane aspects of California government and ignores those
aspects of Brown's philosophy which over the long run will certainly have a deeper
affect on the American polity.
Toward. an end of disseminating the most useful factual information, the
Journal publishes voting records of both the Senate and Assembly, capsulizing in
simple language the bills that were voted upon. It also lists selected governmental
reports and specialized studies of government and law which otherwise might be
missed. An example of the latter is the Journal's August, 1976 offering of The
Southern California Law Review's issue (Vol. 49, No. 4, May, 1976) which fea-
tured six articles about the California Coastal Plan. Unlike most publications
which attempt the substantial, the Journal orients the casual reader by frequently
accompanying articles with basic fact statements such as the article on the Lake
Tahoe basin which separately enumerated the morass of agencies in that area.
Chip Neilson's analysis of the Development of Proposition Nine - the Political Re-
form Act of 1974 -- was accompanied by a succinct summary of the changes. This
was the controversial bill which assured lobbyists headaches, Jerry Brown a politi-
cal career, and confusion for most of the public. But thanks to the Journal's
effort to clarify the technical, the act and its developments were able to be under-
stood by even the most untutored of readers.
CJ also periodically presents a review of the most significant decisions
emanating from the California Supreme Court. It explains the controversies in
clear English, a feat seldom achieved by the legal profession itself. Separate pub-
lications of the California Center for Research and Education in Government are
from time to time included within its pages. One of these, "A Practical Guide to
the State and National Campaign Reform Laws," explicated the necessities of
the Political Reform Act and the Federal Election Campaign Act. Compiled by
Lance Olsen, publisher of the Campaign Law Reporter, this work saves the unini-
tiated virtually scores of hours by simply spelling out the details. The Journal's
"Roster and Guide" contains data about each legislator and executive office-
holder in California, listings of the members of all legislative committees, the times
and places of all regular meetings, and explanatory flow charts of the legislative
process.
Enough said. For those who would be wise in the ways of state govern-
ment and politics, the California Journal is a sine qua non; for others, it exempli-
fies the best of this emerging genre.
--Vincent M. Spohn
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LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice
By Friedrich A. Hayek
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. (London and Henley) 1976. Pp. xiv, 195.
The University of Chicago Press, 1976
With obvious intellectual resignation and an unmistakable aura of pessi-
mism, Nobel prize-winner Friedrich A. Hayek has produced a thoughtful expo-
sition of why "social justice" cannot - and indeed should not -- be legislated in
a free society.
The Mirage of Social Justice is the second in a three-volume work. In the
first, Rules and Order,' Professor Hayek reviewed the historical and philosophical
foundations of the "Open Society," the social order which he believes most
conducive to individual freedom. 2 In the final volume, The Political Order of a
Free Society, the author intends to present alternatives to liberal constitution-
alism which might serve to insure that society's survival.
Central to Mr. Hayek's thesis is his distinction between two fundamental
structures of social order. The first, a "teleocracy," is epitomized by the tribal
society: it is an intentional organization, dominated by public law and comprised
of individuals who share common goals known to all. It is therefore ends-directed,
and the rules governing it serve particular (i.e., specific) purposes; these rules
aim at achieving short-term results. By contrast, the "normocracy," or open
society, is not an organization but a spontaneous order, dominated by private
law and comprised of individuals who not only are not united in the pursuit of
specific common goals, but are ignorant of the aspirations of others. Conse-
quently, the "normocracy" must be means-directed, guided by rules serving un-
known particular ends and aimed at the creation of those conditions which will,
in the long term, be most beneficial to its members. Tribal society is also charac-
terized by its defensive view of outsiders and its emotional approach to law and
morals which attaches to concrete objects in particular situations. The open
society, as the name implies, is theoretically global in extent and function, and
evaluates legal and moral dilemmas rationally on the basis of abstract rules applic-
able to an infinite number of unforeseeable situations.
Aspiring to create "social justice" in an open society raises, in the author's
view, two basic questions. First, does the concept itself have any meaning within
such a market order? Second, can a market order be preserved while imposing
upon it "some pattern of remuneration based on the assessment of the perfor-
mance or needs of different individuals or groups by an authority possessing the
power to enforce it"?
Professor Hayek answers both questions in the negative. Of the first he says:
[t] his conception of 'social' justice is . . .a direct consequence of that
anthropomorphism or personification by which naive thinking tries to
account for all self-ordering processes. It is a sign of the immaturity, of
1. F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty - Volume 1: Rules and Order (1973) (The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago) (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London).
2. See: Review, Law, Legislation and Liberty - Volume 1: Rulesand Order. 3 J. Legis. 62 (1976).
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our minds that we . . . demand from an impersonal process ... that it
conform to the moral precepts men have evolved for the guidance of their
individual actions.
Admittedly, he continues, the distribution of benefits and burdens in a market
system would be unjust if it were the product of intentional human design. But,
like nature, distribution by impersonal market forces in combination with acci-
dent cannot be unjust:
so long as the earnings of particular individuals or groups are not deter-
mined by the decision of some agency, no particular distribution of
incomes can be meaningfully described as more just than another.
Professor Hayek is distressed by what he sees as the result of efforts to
mesh this concept with the mechanics of the market. The opportunity for - and
inevitability of - injustice would then be created, since social justice would
necessitate a coercive agent (presumably the government) directing individuals
to perform certain tasks for certain remuneration. This must be the logical result
of these efforts since
no system of rules of individual just conduct, and therefore no free action
of the individuals, could produce results satisfying any principle of distrib-
utive justice.
Notably, however, Professor Hayek is not adverse to such "social justice"
programs as a guaranteed annual income. Since it would operate outside the
market, is perhaps morally required, and may be in the common interest, such
a program might well be implemented without sacrificing individual freedom or
disturbing the market order.
What does concern the author is the appearance of innumerable interest
groups pressuring government for subsidies, price supports, and similar assis-
tance. Where the cry for social justice was originally raised as a moral appeal to
alleviate Dickensian poverty, it
has in practice become simply the slogan used by all groups whose status
tends to decline-by the farmer, the independent craftsman, the coal
miner, the small shopkeeper, the clerical worker and a considerable part of
the old 'middle class,' rather than the industrial workers on whose behalf
it was first raised but who have in general been the beneficiaries of recent
developments.
The danger lurks in the power of such "corrective measures" as precedents:
"every single act of this kind will give rise to demands by others to be treated on
the same principle; and these demands can be satisfied only if all incomes are thus
allocated."
"Social justice" in this perspective has become a tool of organized in-
terests which can only create divisiveness in society by pitting groups against
one another. If these groups' demands are met, the collapse of both the market
order and the individual's freedom of action is inevitable.
Professor Hayek has little faith in the ability of legislators to resist ac-
ceeding to such demands, thinking submission to be implicit in the electoral
process. In this he is probably correct; a legislator incurring the wrath of a sub-
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stantial organized interest is assured a large bloc of voters opposing him and can
expect scant support from those in whose interest he may have tried to act.
Perhaps because of this pessimism, there is little in this book of what the
author conceives the role of the legislator to be, and this is unfortunate. This may
be a presumptuous criticism, however, since the work does not purport to be a
practical guide for legislators; in any case the thoughtful reader will draw his own
conclusions. Still, it is tantalizing but unsatisfactory to read that:
the aim of legislation, in laying down rules for an unknown number of
future instances, can therefore be only to increase the chances of un-
known persons whose opportunities will chiefly depend on their individ-
ual knowledge and skill as well as on the particular conditions in which
accident will place them.
An illustration might have been useful here and elsewhere, but then this is not an
anecdotal book. Perhaps specifics will be more prominent in the final volume,
in which the author promises to consider "the particular absurdities which arise
when a democracy attempts to determine the distribution of incomes by majority
vote."
There remain also questions which, accepting this as a theoretical work,
have not been fully addressed. In particular, Professor Hayek recognizes the neces-
sity of evolutionary change within a given system, but does not seek to explain
why the advent and advances of interest groups (implicit in the dynamics of an
electoral system) cannot b'e perceived as a symptom of such evolution without
foreboding the system's destruction. Perhaps they cannot, and constitutionalism
must - to borrow an ominous phrase -- collapse amid the roar of its own contra-
dictions. Again, readers must look to the final volume for Professor Hayek's
prescriptions for our ailing social order.
Whatever its flaws, The Mirage of Social Justice is an intriguing and
articulate reformulation of classical liberalism in the light of contemporary pol-
itics, and assuredly of interest to students of legal and political theory. Professor
Hayek ranks among the preeminent scholars of our time, and Law, Legislatioh,
and Liberty promises to be the finest of his works and a significant contribution
to the literature of contemporary jurisprudence.
- Thomas J. Quinn
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